No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/10 : LOC-HAK-281-2-2-5 MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

President Ford

DOS Review Completed.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National

Security Affairs

Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE

DATE & TIME:

Monday, February 3, 197 INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

9:28 - 10:05 a.m.

PLACE:

The Oval Office

Kissinger: On the Congressional delegation, should we go to the Speaker?

President: I would go to the Speaker and Mike to get it broader.

Kissinger: Humphrey thought we should go to Sparkman to have him go to the Speaker and Mike.

President: I see. But they must feel they are a part of it.

Kissinger: Yes, but Humphrey is worried that Mansfield is unbalanced on this. He was unfair on the CIA Committee.

Braden said they are coming after me on

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Maybe you could call Albert to suggest that the Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman designate the committees.

President: I think Helms is going to come out okay. He has them offbalance with the threat to spill.

Kissinger: All the Soviet attaches in East Europe are going to Moscow. Hyland is convinced Brezhnev is in trouble. The manifestations will be

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that they will be slightly warmer to the Europeans and tougher to us.

President: Is it partly his illness?

<u>Kissinger:</u> I think Vladivostok was a nail in the coffin. He gave major concessions and the American reaction hurt him. That, plus the Trade Bill, plus his illness has put him in trouble.

The treaty the Soviets tabled in Geneva contains all the things they dropped out in Vladivostok. Don't attach too much significance to it because it's for bargaining, but there is a slightly harder tone in most of their words and actions.

I am more and more convinced we have to pressure Israel. If we go to Geneva as total failures we will be in bad trouble, but Israel is more and more pushing for Geneva.

President: If we go without a success we will be impotent.

Kissinger: The Egyptians would have to bring more pressure on us, and the Europeans.

About Bhutto. He wants arms aid, at least for symbolic purposes. We will pay a price in India, but it is manageable if we say it is not designed to overturn the balance, unless they scream too loudly and then we will increase it.

President: Give me what India gets and what we would sell them.

Kissinger: It's about \$70-90 million. It also would allow Iran to give them arms.

[The Secretary described Congressional attitudes.]

There is no doubt that India will unleash its troops. They will scream and howl.

President: The Council of Churches will say we are entering the arms race.

Kissinger: Aid for Syria. Syria probably will object to \$25 million.

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President: But that is just under the Continuing Resolution.

Kissinger: I would recommend...

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